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Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Die Erwartungsnutzentheorie (EUT) kann nicht nur fu¨r Entscheidungen auf
individueller Ebene angewandt werden, sondern auch aggregiert in ethischen
Entscheidungssituationen, wie zum Beispiel in Kosten-Nutzen-Analysen bei der
Evaluierung klimapoltischer Politik die vor allem zuku¨nftige Generationen betr-
effen. In diesem Zusammenhang stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern die die EUT mit
katastrophalen Ereignissen mit extrem niedriger Wahrscheinlichkeit umgehen
kann. In unserer Arbeit zeigen wir die Schwierigkeiten der EUT beim Umgang
mit katastrophalen Ereignissen auf. Falls man eine hinreichende Risikoaver-
sion annimmt, tritt eine ”Tyrannei der katastrophalen Risken” (TCR) auf. Die
Projektevaluation kann dann von extrem unwahrscheinlichen Ereignissen do-
miniert werden. Falls die angenommene Risikoaversion sehr gering ist, kann es
passieren, das solche katastrophalen Ereignisse u¨berhaupt keinen Einfluss auf
das Ergebnis haben, was aus ethischer Perspektive genauso bedenklich ist. Der
Artikel tra¨gt bei zu der Literatur u¨ber die Paradoxien der EUT, wie z.B. dem
Allais-Paradoxon oder Martin Weitzmans ”dismal theorem”. Wir behandeln
den spezifischen Fall von katastrophalen Ereignissen mit sehr hohen Scha¨den
und sehr geringer Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit, wie es etwa beim Klimawandel
der Fall sein kann. Nach einem einleitenden Teil zeigen wir in heuristischer Art
und Weise, dass es aus ethischen Gru¨nden notwendig sein kann, die Zahlungs-
bereitschaft zur Vermeidung von Extremereignissen nach oben zu begrenzen.
Wir formalisieren dann die sogenannte ”Tyrannei der katastrophalen Risiken”
(TCR) und zeigen auf, dass das Auftreten der TCR fundamental von der Wahl
der zugrunde liegenden Nutzenfunktion abha¨ngt. Wir folgern, dass man eine
unrealistisch niedrige Risikoaversion annehmen mu¨sste, um die TCR zu vermei-
den. Am Ende bennenen wir die Alternativen zur EUT, die allerdings katas-
trophale Risiken noch mehr beru¨cksichtigen und so das Problem der TCR noch
verscha¨rfen ko¨nnen.
Executive Summary
Expected Utility (EU) theory is not only applied to individual choices but also
to ethical decisions, e.g. in cost-benefit analysis of climate change policy mea-
sures that affect future generations. In this context the crucial question arises
whether EU theory is able to deal with ”catastrophic risks”, i.e. risks of high,
but very unlikely losses, in an ethically appealing way. In this paper we show
that this is not the case. Rather, if in the framework of EU theory a plausi-
ble level of risk aversion is assumed, a ”tyranny of catastrophic risk” (TCR)
emerges, i.e. project evaluation may be dominated by the catastrophic event
even if its probability is negligibly small. With low degrees of risk aversion, how-
ever the catastrophic risk eventually has no impact at all when its probability
goes to zero which is ethically not acceptable as well. Our work contributes to
the literature about the paradoxes of EU theory, like e.g. the Allais paradox or
Martin Weitzmans ”dismal theorem”. In this spirit we will consider the specific
case of catastrophic risks where extremely high losses occur with a very low
probability like for example extreme forms of climate change. After introducing
the problem we give some heuristic motivation and show, that it can be an ethi-
cal imperative that the willingness to pay for avoiding catastrophic risks should
be limited. Then we formalize the so-called ”Tyranny of Catastrophic Risks”
(TCR) and show that it crucially depends on the type of the underlying utility
function whether bad but very unlikely outcomes may dominate the results.
Furthermore we conclude that one would have to assume an implausibly low
degree of risk aversion to exclude TCR. Finally we disucss shortly alternatives
to EU theory, but the intention of most of these approaches is to give catas-
trophic risks more attention instead of less such that the TCR might even be
aggravated.
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Abstract
Expected Utility theory is not only applied to individual choices but
also to ethical decisions, e.g. in cost-benefit analysis of climate change
policy measures that affect future generations. In this context the cru-
cial question arises whether EU theory is able to deal with ”catastrophic
risks”, i.e. risks of high, but very unlikely losses, in an ethically appealing
way. In this paper we show that this is not the case. Rather, if in the
framework of EU theory a plausible level of risk aversion is assumed, a
”tyranny of catastrophic risk” (TCR) emerges, i.e. project evaluation may
be dominated by the catastrophic event even if its probability is negligibly
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1 Introduction
Expected Utility (EU) Theory still provides the standard theoretical tool for
cost-benefit analysis under conditions of risk which, in the context of environ-
mental economics, is used to assess whether conservation or pollution abatement
measures with uncertain consequences are economically beneficial or not. For a
long time this approach, however, has come under attack. So, in many circum-
stances, observable behavior of actual people does not conform to the predictions
of EU theory. Beginning with Allais (1953) [1] and Ellsberg (1961) [9] it has
been shown by a lot of experiments that, regularly, decisions under risk are
subject to paradoxes and anomalies such that individuals act not in accordance
with the axioms of EU theory.
Besides this well-known criticism there is another strand of objections against
EU theory which is, in some sense, related to those of behavioral economics but
conceptually different. So, in some cases, it is already suggested by theoretical
reasoning and thought experiments (”at the desk and not in the lab” ) that
in many situations strict application of EU theory would produce results that
contradict ”plausibility”, i.e. that do not reflect intuitive expectations and seem
hard to accept. A prominent example for this is Rabin (2000) [19] who has first
shown by a purely formal argument that moderate risk aversion w.r.t. to small
lotteries would, if consistently applied, lead to an immoderate high degree of
risk aversion at the large. In a similar vein, standard properties of von Neumann
Morgenstern utility functions (as risk aversion as such and decreasing absolute
risk aversion in particular) initially were motivated by means of introspection
and not by conducting experiments in a systematic way (see Arrow, 1963 [2]).
Even though such considerations refer to behavior of individuals they are
also of relevance in another context. So there is long tradition to apply EU
theory not only to individual decisions under risk but also to ethical choices
concerning the society as a whole (see already Harsanyi, 1955 [12])1. This
ethical dimension of EU theory is not only of a mere abstract theoretical interest
but has much importance for real-life cost-benefit analysis just when, as in the
field of climate change policy (see e.g. Stern, 2006 [22]), the interests of future
1For a critical assessment of Harsanyi‘s ethical interpretation of EU theory see Roemer
(1996, pp. 147 -152)
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generations are to be given due attention. In the ethical context plausibility of
results obtained through the EU approach can get some new and special meaning
since sensibility at the individual level may transform into ethical acceptability
at the collective level. So smoothing income across different states of nature
which is as an implication of decreasing marginal utility of income, i.e. risk
aversion, not only seems to be rational and prudent from a personal viewpoint
but, from the standpoint of the society or an ”ethical observer”, also serves
the purpose to justify a more equal distribution of income and wealth among
different individuals or generations.
Concerning application of EU theory to ethical decisions a main question
is which normative objectives (”values”) can be incorporated by this approach.
So, in particular, it can be asked whether ethically appealing results can be
generated by using specific von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions.
If this is possible, pursuing certain normative ideas would give some legitimate
reason to restrict the class of admissible utility functions, e.g. make different
degrees of risk aversion more or less acceptable. If, however, it is not possible to
exclude ethically non palatable outcomes by adopting particular utility functions
or if for different types of ethical decisions not the same type of utility functions
were obtained this would indicate an only limited applicability of EU theory for
making ethical choices.
In this spirit we will now consider the specific case of catastrophic risks where
extremely high losses occur with a very low probability. It is a common belief in
science that this describes the situation mankind is confronted with in the con-
text of climate change and biodiversity loss. The specific climate change risks
consist of several linked parts: there are severe risks in predicting effects of a
changing climate (scientific risks), uncertainties about effective policy measures
(policy risks) and the size of abatement cost (economic risks). These uncertain-
ties can be additive or even multiplicative. Weitzman’s [25] analysis shows that
in the framework of EU theory ”fat-tailed” risks yield results that are in sharp
conflict to ethical intuition. So, according to EU theory society would always be
willing to pay an extremely high price for avoiding such low likely catastrophes
such that almost any economic progress might be prevented. In this paper we
will consider some variant of this ”dismal theorem” (Weitzman, 2009 [24]) and
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show by very simple arguments that EU theory indeed has much problem to
handle such catastrophic risks in an ethically satisfactory way. We thus confirm
that, from the ethical perspective, fundamental ”limits of expected-utility anal-
ysis” (Dietz and Maddison, 2009, 301 [8]) exist so that alternative approaches
for dealing with catastrophic risk might seem to be more appropriate (Heal,
2008 [13] and Chichilnisky, 2000 [5], 2009 [6]). But unlike Chichilnisky (2000 [5]
and 2009 [6]) we do not purport the view that EU theory is too insensitive w.r.t.
rare events with severe consequences but, in contrast, that utility functions that
show a sensible degree of risk version may entail a dominance or even ”tyranny”
of catastrophic risks.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we give a heuristic motiva-
tion for the problem which is caused for EU theory through catastrophic risks.
In Section 3 we then show, by considering sequences of projects with discrete
probability distributions, that the dominance (”tyranny”) of such catastrophic
risks can only be avoided by applying utility functions with an unusual low de-
gree of risk aversion. If we instead consider single risky projects over an infinite
number of states this tyranny of catastrophic risks is interpreted in a different
way. It then means that expected utility may become infinite even though the
expected value of payoffs is finite. In Section 4 it is demonstrated that also in
this situation unacceptable outcomes can only be avoided in the framework of
EU theory when degrees of relative risk aversion smaller than one are accepted
which seems hard to digest.
3
2 Some Heuristic Motivation
To keep the main argument as simple as possible we first consider a class of
projects (or ”lotteries”) in which there are only two outcomes (”states of na-
ture”). The payoff in the good state is fixed as 푐1 = 1. The payoff in the bad
state 푐2 instead varies and approaches 푐2 = 0 as its lower bound. Assuming
푐2 = 0 as the very worst outcome is a normalization that is common in EU the-
ory. It indicates an absolute catastrophe, e.g. complete extinction of mankind
by an extreme form of climate change. Levels of 푐2 that lie between 0 and 푐1
can, e.g., be interpreted as the share of population or world income that would
remain after an environmental breakdown had happened. The probability of
the bad outcome is denoted 푝2, which will become very small when the payoff
in the bad state approaches zero. So, e.g., we have 푝2 = 10
−6 and at the same
time 푐2 = 10
−7. In such a situation ethical intuition would demand that such
adverse, but very unlikely consequences of climate change are taken into account
to some degree but only within reasonable limits. This in particular means that
very bad outcomes with, however, low probabilities should not let the certainty
equivalent payoffs of the projects go to zero. Or, to put it in another way:
It seems to be an ethical imperative that the willingness to pay for avoiding
catastrophic, but extremely rare losses should be limited and kept away from
zero as it is obviously the case in individual real-life decisions. No reasonable
person will stay at home all time long only to protect herself from the danger of
being killed in a traffic accident or being hit by an airplane crash. Otherwise,
a ”tyranny of catastrophic risks (TCR)” would emerge which, at the individual
level, would be paralyzing normal life and be outright crazy. TCR at the level
of society would mean that the ”social planner” (or ethical observer) almost
completely neglects the prospects of attaining the good state with high wealth
and instead tolerates that the economy runs into poverty only to avoid a still
worse but extremely unlikely outcome. In the next sections it will be examined
how EU theory is able to cope with such situations, i.e. to exclude that project
evaluation leads to such implausible and ethically mistaken results.
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3 The Tyranny of Catastrophic Risks for Se-
quences of Projects
As common in EU theory the risk preferences of a risk-averse ethical observer
are represented by a twice continuously differentiable vNM utility function 푢(푐)
that is defined for all payoff levels 푐 > 0 and has 푢‘(푐) > 0 and 푢“(푐) < 0
everywhere. To simplify the exposition we will consider risky projects with a
discrete probability distribution over 푘+1 states 푖 = 1, 2, . . . , 푘+1 . A project’s
payoff in state 푖 is denoted by 푐푖. For any project 푃 = ((푐1, 푝1); . . . ; (푐푘+1, 푝푘+1)),
the certainty equivalent of 푃푐 is denoted by 푚푢(푃푐) , i.e.
푢(푚푢(푃 )) =
푘+1∑
푖=1
푝푖푢(푐푖).
. The state 푘 + 1 indicates the catastrophic event whose probability 푝푘+1 may
vary and eventually go to zero. To concentrate on the influence of different lev-
els of 푝푘+1 on project evaluation we assume that the conditional probabilities
푝푖 of the non-catastrophic states 푖 = 1, . . . , 푘 in case of non-occurrence of the
catastrophic event are constant. Given some 푝푘+1 the true probability of state
푖 = 1 . . . , 푘 then is 푝푖(푝푘+1) := (1−푝푘+1)푝푖. For any exogenously given combina-
tion of conditional probabilities (푝1, . . . , 푝푘) and payoffs (푐1, . . . , 푐푘) in the ”nor-
mal” non-catastrophic states we then define potentially catastrophic projects
by 푃푐(푐푘+1, 푝푘+1) = ((푐1, 푝1(푝푘+1); . . . ; (푐푘, 푝푘(푝푘+1); (푐푘+1, 푝푘+1))) that depend
on the probability 푝푘+1 and the payoff 푐푘+1 in the catastrophic state. If 푝푘+1 = 0
such a project coincides with the non-catastrophic project 푃푔 = ((푐1, 푝1); . . . ; (푝푘, 푐푘))
that is defined over 푘 states. Loosely speaking, each project 푃푐(푐푘+1, 푝푘+1) is
a mixture between the catastrophic event and the exogenously given 푃푔 . We
now use sequences (푃
(푛)
푐 )푛∈ℕ = (푃
(푛)
푐 (푐
(푛)
푘+1, 푝
(푛)
푘+1))푛∈ℕ of potential catastrophic
projects to give a precise definition for the TCR phenomenon. Then TCR can
be characterized as follows:
Definition 1 Tyranny of catastrophic risks (TCR) holds for a given vNM util-
ity function 푢(푐) if for any given 푃푔 there is a sequence of potentially catastrophic
projects (푃
(푛)
푐 )푛∈ℕ such that lim푛→∞ 푝
(푛)
푘+1 = 0 and simultaneously lim푛→∞푚푢(푃
(푛)
푐 ) =
0.
This Definition means that it is possible that the certainty equivalent payoff
level, i.e. the payoff level the ethical observer accepts to get full insurance
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against risk, goes to zero even if the likelihood of the catastrophic event becomes
arbitrarily small. Then the impact of the catastrophic event - irrespective of
its probability and the payoff levels in the non-catastrophic states - is so great
that it dominates the evaluation of the whole project. What is responsible for
such an extreme sensitivity of project appraisal w.r.t. catastrophic risks will be
shown by the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 TCR always prevails if the utility function 푢(푐) is unbounded
below, i. e. lim푐→0 = −∞.
Proof. We choose some sequence of payoffs (푐
(푛)
푘+1)푛∈ℕ with lim푛→∞ 푐
(푛)
푘+1 =
0 and 푢(푐
(푛)
푘+1) < 0 for all 푛 ∈ ℕ. Then we define a corresponding sequence of
probabilities by letting 푝
(푛)
푘+1 := (−푢(푐(푛)푘+1))−훼 for some arbitrary 훼 ∈ (0, 1) and
any 푛 ∈ ℕ. Since lim푐→0(−푢(푐))−훼 = 0 we clearly have lim푛→∞ 푝(푛)푘+1 = 0. For
the limit of expected utility we get lim푛→∞
∑푘
푖=1 푝푖(푝
(푛)
푘+1)푢(푐푖)+푝
(푛)
푘+1푢(푐
(푛)
푘+1) =∑푘
푖=1 푝푖푢(푐푖) + lim푛→∞(−(−푢(푐(푛)푘+1))1−훼) = −∞, which directly gives
lim푛→∞푚푢(푃
(푛)
푐 ) = 0.
Proposition 1 in particular shows that it is not necessarily true that EU
theory ”underestimates the outcomes of small-probability events” and thus ”is
biased against certain environmental projects that are designed to prevent catas-
trophic events” (Chichilnisky 2000, p. 226 [5]). Rather, it crucially depends on
the type of the underlying utility function whether very bad but simultaneously
very unlikely outcomes may drag the certainty equivalent payoff level finally
down to the minimum payoff level (= 0). If the utility function has no lower
bound TCR becomes unavoidable. The relationship of unboundedness below
to standard curvature properties of the utility function is obvious: A utility
function is unbounded below if it is sufficiently risk averse. A precise sufficient
condition for that is that for the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion
휂(푐) = −푢“(푐)푐푢‘(푐) we have 휂(푐) ≥ 1 for all 푐 > 0 (see Gollier 2001 [11]).
That the degree of risk aversion of the underlying utility function is respon-
sible for TCR is also highlighted by another observation. So any sequence of
projects which leads to TCR criterion for some initially given utility function
keeps this property for any other utility function with an overall higher degree
of risk aversion. This is due to the general fact that higher risk aversion gives
rise to lower levels of certainty equivalents for all risky projects (see e.g. Gollier,
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2001 [11]).
Utility functions which have relative risk aversion 휂(푐) above one and thus
imply TCR do not seem to be very extraordinary and special. They are even
required to avoid other ethically undesired consequences as e.g. an extreme high
savings rate and thus an unfair distribution between generations. As has been
shown by Dasgupta (2008) [7] in the framework of a simple Ramsey growth
model the savings rate would come close to 100 % if the elasticity of marginal
utility were equal to or smaller than one. Such an ”oversaving” would, however
impose an unduly high and ethically indefensible burden on earlier generations.
Moreover, elasticities of marginal utility below one would entail some violation
of the principle of ”circumstance solidarity”2: Any increase in the productivity
of capital would harm the earlier generations through imposed higher savings
in the optimal solution although the technical progress would allow for a Pareto
improvement for all generations. In the case of an infinite number of periods,
휂(푐) > 1 moreover is required to make the utility sum converge without accept-
ing pure utility time discount which would give future generation less weight in
social evaluation and thus give them an unfair treatment ex ante.
For Weitzman (2009c) [26] 휂(푐) = 1 represents the ”lowest lower bound” for
acceptable levels of relative risk aversion, and in empirical studies on the costs
and benefits of climate change assuming 휂 ≥ 1 is the rule and not the exeption3.
Therefore we can conclude that one would have to assume an implausibly low
and ethically contestable degree of risk aversion to exclude TCR.
Concerning boundedness properties there clearly is a sharp dichotomy be-
tween utility functions: Either they are bounded from below or not. Whereas
for all utility functions that are unbounded below TCR is inevitable according
to Proposition 1, boundedness from below generates the opposite result. In this
case only the outcome in the non-catastrophic states eventually counts when
the probability of the catastrophic state goes to zero. This is shown by the
following Proposition.
2(see Fleurbaey 2008 [10], for a general discussion of this criterion and Buchholz and
Schumacher 2010 [4], for an application to the intergenerational context)
3(see Stern 2006 [22], where the mainly used value of constant relative risk aversion is
휂 = 1, or Nordhaus 2008 [18], where 휂 = 2 is applied)
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Proposition 2 Assume that the utility function 푢(푐) is bounded below. Then
for any sequence of projects (푃
(푛)
푐 )푛∈ℕ as defined above, expected utility con-
verges to expected utilty without catastrophic risk
∑푘
푖=1 푝푖푢(푐푖) if the catastrophic
payoff 푐
(푛)
푘+1 is bounded from above.
Proof. This follows since lim푛→∞ 푝
(푛)
푘+1 = 0 implies lim푛→∞ 푝
(푛)
푘+1푐
(푛)
푘+1 = 0 as
(푐
(푛)
푘+1)푛∈ℕ is bounded from above and lim푛→∞ 푝푖(푝
(푛)
푘+1) = 푝푖 for all 푖 = 1, . . . , 푘.
Combining Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 shows that EU theory cannot
help falling from one extreme into the other, i.e. either to have, in the limit, dom-
inance of the catastrophic risk or to neglect it completely. No way in between
is viable that, in the framework of EU theory, would allow for a compromise
between both extremes that conforms to ethical intuition: Give bad outcomes
with low probabilities some attention but not too much. This shows that ap-
plication of EU theory makes it impossible to reconcile two ”beliefs” on the
adequate treatment of catastrophic risks that have been articulated by Ikefuji
et al. (2010, 3 - 4 [14]): ”Catastrophic risks are important” on the one hand
and ”the price to reduce catastrophic risks is finite” on the other!
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4 The Tyranny of Catastrophic Risks for Given
Probability Distributions
The potential dominance of catastrophic risks in the case of utility functions
that are not bounded from below is also reflected by an another insight which
is related to Proposition 1. This additional result, however, does not refer to
sequences of projects as in our previous analysis but, in a situation with an
infinite number of states, to a single probability distribution of payoffs and is
thus more in the tradition of the existing literature (see Chichilnisky 2000 [5]
and 2009 [6] or Weitzman 2009 [25]).
Proposition 3 Let the underlying utility function be unbounded from below.
Then there always exists a risky project 푃∞ = (푐푖, 푝푖)푖∈ℕ with infinitely many
outcomes 푖 = 1, 2, . . . for which the expected utility value of payoffs is finite but
expected utility is infinite.
Proof. Without loss of generality it can be assumed that 푠푢푝푐>0푢(푐) ≥ 0.
We choose some 훼 ∈ (0, 1). In order to construct a discrete probability distri-
bution let, for any 푖 ∈ ℕ, a payoff level 푐푖 be given by 푢(푐푖) = −2 푖+1훼 . The
existence of each 푐푖 follows from the assumptions that 푢(푐) has no lower bound
and is continuous. Similar as in the proof of Proposition 1, now define proba-
bilities by letting 푝푖 := (−푢(푐푖)−훼) = 2(−푖+1) for any 푖 ∈ ℜ. Since
∑∞
푖=1 푝푖 =∑∞
푖=1 2
−(푖+1) = 1 a probability distribution of payoffs is obtained in this way.
The sequence of payoffs (푐푖)푖∈ℕ is decreasing in 푖 and converges to 0. Therefore,
on the one hand we have
∑∞
푖=1 푝푖푐푖 < (
∑∞
푖=1 푝푖) 푐1 <∞, i.e. the expected value
of payoffs is finite. On the other hand, we have 푝푖푢(푐푖) = −(−푢(푐푖))(1−훼) for all
푖 ∈ ℕ such that lim푖→∞ 푝푖푢(푐푖) = −∞ and thus
∑∞
푖=1 푝푖푢(푐푖) = −∞.
The result in Proposition 3 might appear to be in some contrast to that of
Arrow (1974) who has shown that a finite expectation of payoffs always entails
finiteness of expected utility if the utility function is concave. But, more or
less implicitly and without further discussions, Arrow (as Chichilnisky 2000 [5]
and 2009 [6]) has excluded utility functions that are unbounded below from the
beginning. His focus instead has been, in the tradition of Menger (1934) [17], on
(non-)boundedness of utility functions from above, which is of particular impor-
tance in growth theory to ensure discrimination between feasible consumption
paths. In this context it is also important to note that for all isoelastic util-
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ity functions except the logarithmic one non-boundedness below (which causes
TCR) is equivalent to boundedness above (which is the standard assumption in
EU theory, see Arrow, 1971).
In the probability distribution that is constructed in the proof of Proposi-
tion 3, the sequence of probabilities (푝푖) converges to zero. So again it is the
occurrence of very rare events with a bad outcome by which expected utility
is driven down to minus infinity if utility is not bounded below. In this sense,
Proposition 3 can be interpreted as another variant of the TCR phenomenon
and Weitzman’s dismal theorem.
In view of Proposition 3 one might wonder whether for a fixed probability
distribution of payoffs over an infinite number of states a specific choice of the
utility function could prevent expected utility to become infinite. On the one
hand, this is trivially true since any utility function that is bounded below al-
ways gives a finite value of expected utility. This e.g. holds true for exponential
utility functions and for the Burr utility functions that both have 푢(0) = 0 (see
especially Ikefuji et al. 2010 [14] for an application of such utility functions to
catastrophic risks). But if on the other hand one applies the ethically more
appealing utility functions that have a degree of relative risk aversion nowhere
below one, as suggested here, a negative result is obtained again. To show this
we use the procedure as described in the proof of Proposition 3, to construct
a probability distribution of payoffs taking 푢(푐) = 푙푛 푐 as the utility function.
Then expected utility not only becomes infinite for this specialy utility function
whose relative risk aversion is 휂 = 1 but also for all other utility functions that
have an overall higher risk aversion, especially for all isoelastic utility functions
with constant elasticity of marginal utility 휂 > 1. Therefore we can conclude
that probability distributions with finite expected value of payoffs exist such
that, for all utility functions with reasonable high degrees of risk aversion ex-
pected utility will not be finite. This once again shows the restricted capability
of EU theory to cope with TCR.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has made a simple case against the suitability of EU theory to take
with the TCR phenomenon into account, i.e. to avoid dominance of very bad
but unlikely events in project evaluation: If the underlying vNM utility function
is unbounded below always situations can be found in which TCR prevails and
the price to prevent catastrophic losses may become too high. In the framework
of EU theory the obvious solution would be to adopt utility functions that are
bounded below. Then, however, catastrophic events with a low probability no
longer have any significant impact on decisions such that the child is thrown out
with the bath. Moreover, adopting utility functions that are bounded below is
tantamount to assuming implausibly low and ethically non-acceptable degrees
of relative risk aversion .
The alternative either is to amend EU theory, e.g. by introducing certain
threshold levels (see e.g. Baumga¨rtner et al., 2008 [3]), or to leave EU theory
instead applying some variant of non-expected utility theory4 or Kriysiak (2009
[16]). The intention of most of these approaches, however, is to give catastrophic
risks more attention instead of less such that the TCR might even be aggravated.
So, concerning possible solutions of the TCR problem , one should not expect
too much from these alternatives to EU theory that have yet been proposed. A
straightforward an unambiguous way out of the TCR dilemma not yet seems to
exist.
4(see Sugden 1997 [23]). For a general review of such approaches see Sugden 1997 [23] and
Shaw and Woodward 2008 [21] for a discussion of their potential relevance for environmental
economics or other decision criteria as, e.g., that developed by Chichilnisky (2000 [5] and 2009
[6])
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